Preventing polarization with cooperation: engaging with civil society and armed groups in peace negotiations.

The practice of peace negotiations is something that has been exercised for centuries. Since Thucydides described how the Greek states and Athens achieved the Peace of Nicias, other historians have been redacting about the way peace emerges from war (Holsti 1991, p. 1; Crawley 2009). However, it was not until the end of the Cold War that the discipline of conflict resolution grew as a “defined specialist field” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p. 3). With a new security architecture, different challenges and the need for modern engagement frameworks also came (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, pp. 415-417). The dynamics associated with peace negotiations and questions about who should engage in these processes are at the forefront of these contemporary discussions.

In respect of peace negotiations, although they are “conflict-specific” (Paffenholz 2014, p. 6), this essay argues that states, armed groups, and civil society should be allowed a seat at the table. This position will be sustained through the claim that the engagement between states, civil society and armed groups enables: (1) the creation of patterns of behaviour and predictability criteria (knowledge of the group), and (2) the prevention of further group polarisation. Drawing from interstate liberal peace theory (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane and Martin 1995), this paper suggests that cooperation is the most liable path, for it creates a framework of information sharing and provides coherence to states that portray themselves as liberal democracies. Ultimately, the correlation between these elements will be detrimental for the whole peace process, helping to create sustainable peace.

This essay will start by discussing the relevant literature regarding the evolution between exclusion and inclusion debates and proscription regimes. Then, the main concepts applied will be analysed and a broad definition will be provided. After this, the argument will be developed through two phases. First, it will be theoretically argued how this essay’s claims are achievable and how they could benefit the peace process. Second, empirical data will be shown to support the idea that the presence of civil society and armed groups in peace negotiations benefits not only the duration of peace, but also the odds of achieving it. As a final remark, the ongoing challenges will be discussed in complement with the limitations of the essay’s analysis. Both theoretically and empirically, this structure proves useful to illustrate how the presented framework integrating armed groups and civil society in peace talks benefits the peace process.

The dynamics surrounding war and peace are some of the core elements that constitute the discipline of international relations (Carr et al. 1948, p. 8; Holsti 1991). The ways war and peace are studied have been changing throughout time and, sometimes, as a consequence of events that severely disrupt history. This was the case for the Cold War. Many changes came with its end, from rearrangements of borders and the balance of power, to the emergence of different types of conflicts (Bercovitch 1996). Whether labelled “new wars”, “post-modern” wars, or “hybrid wars” (Kaldor 1999, pp. 2-3; 2013, pp. 1-7), conflicts seem to have changed and, consequently, so did the approaches necessary to study them (Mundy 2011).

This context of mutation led to two divergent practices that constitute two sides of the conflict management coin: the side of counterterrorism, espousing exclusivity and manifested by proscription, and the side of mediation, characterised by inclusivity (Lanz 2011, p. 278; Federer 2019, p. 24). These opposing views became more prominent with the events of September 11, 2001, that marked the beginning of the “war on terrorism” (Office of the Press Secretary of the United States 2001).

There are two main propositions that appear to be argued almost unanimously in the literature surrounding exclusion: (1) that negotiations provide legitimacy to terrorists and “undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means” (Nuemann 2007; Toros 2008, pp. 410-411), and that (2) these terrorists are either “too far off” or extremely hard to approach due to their ruthlessness and intense indoctrination (Wilkinson 2001). To give legitimacy to terrorist groups is seen here as a reward for bad behaviour, with some authors willing to argue that it eventually leads to more violence (Clutterbuck 1992). Thus, exclusivity is intrinsically linked to proscription, or, “the act of listing an armed group as a terrorist organization” (Hapeslagh 2013, p. 189). The goal with proscription appears to be the delegitimisation of armed groups, or even their demonisation, stripping them from their humanity and individual characteristics (Toros 2018).

Regarding inclusivity, the literature is not only broad, but fragmentated in several sub-fields, from the exclusion/inclusion of women in peace talks (Opotow et al. 2005; Racioppi and See 2006; O’Reilly et al. 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016), to the emphasis on the role of civil society (Belloni 2001; Kew and John 2008; CSPPS 2014; 2015; McCandless 2016) and beyond. In the broader context, researchers studying peace processes tend to lean toward some form of inclusivity, while practitioners often hesitate to do this overtly, therefore recurring to “back channel[s]” (Kissinger 1979, p. 138). Nonetheless, as put by Federer (2019, p. 20), “the categorical ban on speaking to proscribed armed groups no longer characterises reality or practice” (see also Zartman and Touval 1985; Lanz 2011, p. 278). Authors arguing in favour of inclusion commonly focus on (international) mediation, a concept defined by Bercovitch et al. (1991, p. 8) as:

A process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organisation to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.

The debate surrounding inclusivity literature encompasses not only the discussion about who gets to seat at the table (Lanz 2011; Federer 2019), but also the different modalities through which this might happen (Paffenholz 2014), and the best timing to make it happen (Kleiboer 1996, pp. 362-363; Zartman 2000). The driving argument supporting inclusivity literature is that a stable and long-lasting peace can only be achieved through engagement with several relevant actors, thus rejecting proscription and exclusion (Toros 2008; Hapeslagh 2013).

Concerning the definitions of the main concepts applied in this essay, only armed groups and civil society remain unspecified. As there is no universal shared definition of armed groups in the academic debate (Schlichte 2009, p. 24) they will be analysed here through the lens of the International Council on Human Rights Policy (cited in Hofman 2006, p. 396) that “describes them as groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control”. Moreover, they must be pursuing a political or economic end. For the purpose of this essay, terrorists and mercenaries alike will be added to this definition. Civil society is here defined as “organizations that take voluntary collective action around shared interests” (Paffenholz 2014, p. 70) and that are not controlled by states, kinship, or family ties (Orjuela 2003, p. 196). They take several different shapes, from trade unions to research institutions (Paffenholz 2014, p. 70), as long as they are not “driven by the power logics of the state nor by market interests” (Orjuela 2003, p. 196).

This essay predicates the importance of armed groups and civil societies in peace talks in two main assumptions: (1) that it creates patterns of behaviour and predictability criteria, and (2) that it prevents group polarisation. The suggestion is that both conditions are detrimental for establishing lasting peace and for enabling liberal democracies to stick to their “liberal beings”.

In regard to the creation of patterns of behaviour, this essay makes use of interstate liberal peace theory’s idea that “repeated interactions” (Fearon 2018, p. 525) between parties can provide shared knowledge and bolster cooperation. Even in structural terms, there is the possibility of an analogy between interstate cooperation and peace negotiations. Academics arguing for cooperation do not detach themselves from the anarchical structure of the international system, nor do they ignore the lack of means to hierarchically enforce agreements (Keohane and Martin 1995, p. 39; Martin 2017, p. 354). Similarly, the need for peace negotiations arises from an element (armed groups) “operating outside effective state control” (Hapeslagh 2013, p. 190), creating a vacuum in the central authority.

            With the above parallel clarified, it is understandable to see the importance of armed groups in peace negotiations. Instead of proscribing armed groups, treating them as monolithic terrorists and therefore “reducing a group or movement to its terrorist acts” and limiting “the group’s possibilities of being anything but a ‘terrorist group’” (Toros 2008, p. 422; see also Hapeslagh 2013, p. 202), there is instead a path towards communication and understanding. Hapeslagh (2013, pp. 199-201) clarifies accurately that contact and information sharing is crucial in order to interpret armed groups’ behaviour and make sense of their world view (and vice-versa). Another key element is the placement of civil society in these talks, as a means to make it easier to grasp local challenges, insights, and build trust (Hapeslagh 2013, p. 200). Trust is one of the major components of peace talks and is indicated as an issue in diverse conflicts (Kelman 2005; Wagner 2006; Çelebi et al. 2014). The same concerns about trust and cheating float around interstate cooperation (Martin 2017). Nonetheless, countries still largely cooperate with each other effectively. When the mutual advantages of open dialogue between conflicting parties outweigh the disadvantages of avoiding it, the path towards engagement opens (Kelman 2005, p. 641; Pruitt 2006, p. 380). Following the presented analogy, rational choice theory also presents some explanations for conflict, such as “miscalculations due to lack of information” (Fearon 1995, p. 381), a problem which could be mitigated through the implementation of a framework of communication and information sharing.

            Proceeding to group polarisation, this highly studied effect (Lamm and Myers 1978; Isenberg 1986; Sunstein 1999; 2002) also could be alleviated through opening dialogue with conflicting parties. The concept of group polarisation is that members of groups tend to move towards the extremities pointed by the “members’ predeliberation tendencies” (Sunstein 2002, p. 176). The idea here is that the exposure of said groups to different ideas can decrease “attitudinal polarization” (Messing and Eastwood 2016, p. 1058). In this case, instead of members of armed groups being further radicalised through constant interactions with their “echo chamber” (Sunstein 2009; Del Vicario et al. 2015, p. 1; Flaxman et al. 2016, p. 317) and building their identities in opposition to the “other” (Yuval-Davies 2010, p. 276), the opening of dialogue would allow the entry of “ideologically crosscutting viewpoints” (Bakshy et al. 2015, p. 1131).

Hapeslagh (2013, pp. 201-202) mentions Hamas as an example of polarisation, portraying the effect of this “echo chamber of the like-mindedness” (Gunning 2010, cited in Hapeslagh 2013, p. 201), given the fact that the group has had less interaction with western states, and consequently has further tilted to the Iranian side, becoming more entrenched. Some civil society groups are trying to circumvent this lack of state engagement and have had significant results, manifesting their potential as participants in the peace process. Geneva Call (2020), for instance, is a neutral humanitarian organisation that is engaging with armed groups and pushes them to abide by the “‘rules of war’ as enshrined in international humanitarian law”, with focus on the Geneva Conventions.

Taking into consideration that the points regarding the creation of patterns of behaviour and the prevention of group polarisation through engagement have been settled, there is yet another theoretical reason to bring civil society and armed groups to the discussion table: liberal democratic practice. By providing an open dialogue channel, liberal states can act in accordance to their identity. Instead of proscribing armed groups as terrorists or side-lining civil society to the periphery of peace negotiations by embarking in secret talks, liberal states can be true to their normative selves through inclusion. Paffenholz (2015, p. 9) goes as far as to argue that there “may even be a moral obligation, and an international responsibility based on the ‘right to participate’”. Additionally, nominally liberal states such as the United States, not only create deep ties with other states that allegedly sponsor terrorist organisations (Gold 2004, Byman 2005, pp. 219-258), but they themselves have sponsored terrorism (George 1991) and acted in ways that, depending on the definition of terrorism, could be considered as such (Blakeley 2007). Reflecting upon this leads to the conclusion that some liberal states have only an artificial moral high ground to stand on when proscribing armed groups. A method to try to mitigate that would be to, at least, act in accordance to the way they portray themselves: as liberal democracies.

            It is established that inclusion of armed groups and civil society would bring about detrimental information for the peace process and prevent the further polarisation of armed groups. Additionally, engagement is seen here as a tool that enables liberal states to enact in a liberal manner, opening dialogue with relevant actors. With the theoretical framework of the argument presented, some empirical examples will follow in order to further justify the presence of armed groups and civil society in peace talks. These examples will focus not only on the negotiation phase, but also on the peace process itself, considering that the duration of the peace is a crucial element in the analysis of the success of peace talks.

            Civil society and armed groups have all the potential to be important players in the peace process. In a RAND study, Jones and Libicki (2010, pp. 5-8) assessed “648 groups that existed between 1968 and 2006” to examine “how terrorist groups end” and infer that the most common way is through “a transition to the political process”. The study goes on to argue that peace settlements are one of the essential ways through which conflicts feeble, referring to the struggles in Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Colombia (Jones and Libicki 2010, pp. 21-23). It is visible through these examples that “effective dialogue must be an integral part on any process aimed at truly resolving” conflicts (Barnes 2006, pp. 7-8), and that, in these cases, the presence of armed groups was key. Additionally, Jones and Libicki’s (2010) RAND study discovers that the narrower the groups’ claims were, the greater were the chances of achieving peace. Taking into consideration that if there were to be open dialogue between civil society, armed groups and states, there would not only be more mutual understanding, but also less polarisation, the possibility of narrowing down the groups’ claims should be higher. Thus, achieving peace should also be an easier task.

            Concerning the specific role of civil society in peace processes, as portrayed by Nilsson (2012), there are plenty of case-studies describing how its presence affects the duration and the quality of the established peace. However, Nilsson (2012) takes the analysis of civil society’s role a step further, systematising it, and therefore looking at the importance of civil society from a broader, “birds-eye” perspective. Studying 83 post-cold war peace agreements, she finds that when civil society was added into the peace process, “the risk of peace failing regarding the signatories is reduced by 64%”, stating that it seemed “to matter for the durability of peace” (Nilson 2012, pp. 256-262). Whether through improving the agreements legitimacy (Kew and John 2008, p. 16), supporting implementation (Ross 2017, p. 7), or developing “alternative systems of self-help and informal forms of governance” and “empowering local capacities” (Nilsson 2018, pp. 137-138), the examples here portrayed support the claim that civil society’s role in peace processes has produced positive effects.

            In addition to Nilsson’s (2012) systematised analysis of civil society’s importance in peace processes, a prior study by Kew and John (2008) is worth consideration. These authors, in an attempt to find a parallel “between civil society’s direct involvement” in peace negotiations and the sustainability of the peace, notice “that a strong relationship exists between direct and indirect civil society participation in peace negotiations and successful peacebuilding” (Kew and John 2008, pp. 12-30). Moreover, their study suggests that when civil society is not involved, there is a greater chance of “a resumption of warfare” (Kew and John 2008, p. 28). Although case-studies are detrimental to understand “causal pathways” (Nilsson 2012, p. 263) for the participation of civil society, wider analysis such as Nilsson’s and Kew and John’s (2008) contribute greatly to the broader discussion about who gets a seat at the table.

            Through the structure of this essay, two main reasons were presented as to why the role of civil society and armed groups are detrimental to the totality of peace processes. The main contribution derives from the theoretical framework of the intertwinement between the creation of patterns of behaviour and knowledge acquisition, and the prevention of group polarisation through engagement, as a means to achieve peace. The parallel between interstate liberal peace theory and inclusion dynamics in peace talks enables a new, original vision, attempting to justify the presence of armed groups and civil society in the peace process. Moving over from the theoretical to the empirical realm, this essay compiled relevant and wide-ranging studies justifying its claims, namely, that civil society and armed groups can, and do have, a positive impact on the different phases throughout peace processes.

            However relevant the critiques surrounding armed groups and civil society are (Wilkinson 2001; Barnes 2002; Fischer 2006; Belloni 2008), or the states’ historic trauma regarding negotiation (Spector 1998; Logevall and Osgood 2010; Wallensteen 2018, p. 4), in reality, armed groups are specifically becoming a common feature of peace talks (Federer 2019, pp. 20-25) and civil society’s role has been increasingly praised (McCandless 2016). The ongoing challenges reside on the modalities through which civil society and armed groups should be inserted in peace talks, with particular focus on the concept of “ripeness” (Zartman 2000; 2001; 2008). They also reside on the issue of “spoilers” (Stedman 1997; Greenhill and Major 2007; Steinert et al. 2019), as both these challenges represent inherent threats to peace processes (Stedman 1997, p. 7). To tackle these issues, additional research is fundamental, particularly case-studies able to address context-specific circumstances and account for alternative solutions.

            This essay provided a broad assessment of peace negotiations, with a particular emphasis on armed groups and civil society. However, research has been fruitful in detailing how many other actors play a crucial role in peace talks (Paffenholz 2014). The argument offered in this paper is limited by its broad analytical scope, focusing on two major players as possible benefactors to the peace process. Considerations regarding women, for example, have been of great importance and provided both wide scope and in-depth, tailored analysis on the role of women in peace talks (Racioppi and See 2006; O’Reilly et al. 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016; Krause et al. 2018).

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